UNGA 81: ONE STAGE, DIFFERENT SCORES

By Beatrice Mujuni

Imagine you are seated in an orchestra hall, watching a performance. Before you are violinists, cellists, flautists and pianists, each playing an instrument under the direction of an orchestra conductor. Although their sounds differ, they follow the same score and produce a harmonious symphony. This is the ideal vision of the world order: nations with different histories, interests and political systems working from shared rules towards a common purpose.

Now imagine the same musicians and the same orchestra conductor, but they no longer agree on the musical score. Some believe parts of the composition should be rewritten, while others disagree over how it should be interpreted and played. Some follow only the parts that suit them, and when the performance begins, each plays skilfully, but together they produce discord. This is increasingly what we see in the international system today. The world is not simply out of tune, states are divided over the rules, what they mean, and how they should be applied.

The 81st United Nations General Assembly (UNGA 81) has exposed this divergence. Representatives of 193 Member States enter the same chamber and repeatedly invoke peace, sovereignty, justice, development, international law and cooperation. Yet agreement on the vocabulary often conceals disagreement over its meaning. Sovereignty can mean protection from external interference in one speech and freedom to pursue national interests in another. International law is defended as universal, then interpreted selectively when strategic allies or rivals are involved.

The competing scores are clearest in how major powers describe the international order. The United States often frames leadership through national strength, alliances and defence of its interests. China emphasises sovereign equality, non-interference and ‘true multilateralism’. Russia invokes multipolarity and the security interests of major states. Europe's leaders stress rules, institutions and accountability. These positions are not entirely incompatible, but rest on different assumptions about who sets the tempo, whose interpretation prevails and whether the same restraints apply when national interests are at stake.

Opening the General Debate, UN Secretary-General António Guterres warned that the cracks in the international system had become canyons. He identified four tests of power: war and peace, inequality, climate change and artificial intelligence. His question was whether power would be exercised through law or beyond it. That question reaches the heart of the disorder. The international community has not run out of principles, it is simply struggling to agree on when those principles override power.

The consequences extend beyond diplomatic language. The Uppsala Conflict Data Program recorded 65 state-involved armed conflicts in 2025, the highest number since its records began in 1946. Around 244,600 people were killed in organised violence that year. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute estimates that global military expenditure reached a record $2.887 trillion in 2025, marking an eleventh consecutive increase. Those figures describe a world investing heavily in its capacity to confront rather than in its willingness to compromise.

And now, the UN Reform is on the table, but entirely faulting the UN as though it were an all-powerful conductor is too easy. We also need to acknowledge the complexity of what we expect the UN to do. Imagine bringing 193 states, with competing national interests, different political systems, unequal power, and often completely opposing positions, into one room and expecting consensus. That was never going to produce a perfect system. The UN can convene, mediate, document, coordinate assistance and give nearly every nation a voice, but ultimately its authority and resources depend on its members.

For Africa, this moment demands more than commentary on others. Throughout the debate, African leaders consistently raise Security Council reform, debt, climate finance, development, peace and the unequal cost of capital. With considerable representation and growing strategic importance, the continent is being courted for critical minerals, markets, and diplomatic partnerships. That certainly creates options, although options become influence only when they are converted into clear negotiating positions. Africa does not have to speak with one voice on every issue, but I would say, it does need greater clarity about where interests converge and how those interests can be advanced in negotiations on trade, finance and technology.

Otherwise, 54 speeches can still amount to 54 solos unless they are connected to clear, coordinated positions and sustained negotiation after the General Debate ends.

And this is not to say that, coordination requires every African country to adopt an identical foreign policy. But there should be foresight on what on outcomes the continent will pursue collectively. So ideally, answering questions like, what financing reforms would change Africa's development prospects? What principles should shape artificial intelligence so Africa is not merely a source of data, minerals or consumers? And what form of permanent Security Council representation would carry legitimacy?

Beneath the measured language of diplomacy, discord persists, but its social consequences are often far removed from the rooms in which foreign policy is negotiated. Conflict disrupts livelihoods, displaces families and raises the cost of food and energy. It also places greater pressure on public resources needed for employment, healthcare, education and climate resilience. The orchestra may be assembled in New York, the consequences of its discord are felt in the daily lives of people far beyond it.

Here in Uganda, these issues are not theoretical. Our third National Development Plan was more than 95% aligned with the Sustainable Development Goals, and so far, three Voluntary National Reviews have been completed. Yet the latest review found that only 26.1% of our SDG targets were on track, while 54.2% showed limited progress and 19.7% had stagnated. As a landlocked country, we feel global instability quickly, shocks to fuel costs filter into food prices, businesses and household incomes. We also host more than two million refugees and asylum-seekers, placing additional pressure on livelihoods and public services as humanitarian financing declines. This is the context in which Uganda called at UNGA 81 for a binding right to development that addresses structural global inequalities. For us, multilateralism is measured beyond resolutions, by whether schools and hospitals can cope, young people can find decent work, and development ambitions can be financed.

Now just thinking out loud what would a UNGA 81 win look like? It may be quieter than the headlines suggest. A meeting could reopen a diplomatic channel, soften a position or prevent a disagreement from becoming a crisis. None of this would necessarily produce a treaty or a dramatic announcement. Diplomacy is unusual in that its success can sometimes be measured by what does not happen. By the end of the General Debate, the orchestra may still be far from perfect harmony, though I would like to think that preventing the discord from becoming a complete breakdown would itself be an achievement.

The author is an international development and strategic communications specialist who writes on diplomacy, sustainable development and global affairs.