Last week, the leaders of Egypt and Somalia gathered in Asmara, Eritrea’s capital to form what is now being described as an axis against Ethiopia.
Seen by many as Egypt leading efforts to isolate the government in Addis Ababa with experts saying it is an attempt to bring hatred against Abiy Ahmed’s government.
“This is an axis against Addis Ababa. I think it’s an attempt to bring the hate together in trying to increase pressure against Addis Ababa,” Hassan Khannenje, director of the Horn International Institute for Strategic Studies, told the BBC.
However, this move to form a regional coalition aimed at isolating Ethiopia has hit a significant roadblock, as Djibouti has reportedly declined an invitation to be part of the tripartite alliance with Eritrea and Somalia. Inaugurated on October 10, 2024, in Asmara, Eritrea, this alliance—seen by some analysts as an “axis of ill will”—is a geopolitical maneuver intended to counter Ethiopia’s growing influence in the Horn of Africa, which observers say will fail. However, Djibouti’s decision to distance itself from the bloc highlights the practical limitations of Egypt’s ambitions.
Egypt’s Geopolitical Strategy
Egypt’s foreign policy in the Horn of Africa has increasingly centered on containing Ethiopia, particularly over the long-standing dispute concerning the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) on the Blue Nile. Ethiopia’s dam project, which Cairo views as a direct threat to its water security, has been a focal point of tension between the two nations. The Asmara alliance is widely perceived as part of Egypt’s broader strategy to encircle Ethiopia diplomatically and economically.
By aligning with Eritrea and Somalia—two nations with their own histories of strained relations with Ethiopia—Egypt hopes to create a united front against Addis Ababa’s regional dominance. Eritrea’s historic rivalry with Ethiopia and Somalia’s volatile relationship with its neighbour provide Egypt with natural partners in this venture. However, the exclusion of Djibouti from the alliance weakens Egypt’s ability to fully execute its containment strategy.
Djibouti’s Strategic Calculation
Djibouti’s reluctance to join the alliance stems from its deep economic interdependence with Ethiopia. As Ethiopia’s primary access point to the sea, Djibouti handles nearly 90% of Ethiopian trade through its ports, contributing an estimated $3 billion annually to its economy. This crucial economic relationship makes it difficult for Djibouti to align with a bloc that could be seen as hostile to Ethiopia.
For Djibouti, the risks of joining the alliance far outweigh the potential gains. Aligning with Egypt, Eritrea, and Somalia against Ethiopia would not only jeopardize its trade revenues but also potentially destabilize the Horn of Africa further—a region already fraught with conflicts and fragile alliances. Djibouti’s stance is thus one of pragmatic neutrality, reflecting its desire to maintain stability and economic growth by preserving its role as a critical trade hub for landlocked Ethiopia.
Implications for the Asmara Alliance
Djibouti’s absence from the alliance raises questions about the long-term viability and effectiveness of Egypt’s regional strategy. While the tripartite alliance presents a unified front on paper, the lack of Djibouti—a key player in the Horn of Africa’s trade and security architecture—diminishes the alliance’s ability to comprehensively isolate Ethiopia. Without Djibouti, the coalition lacks access to the most vital regional trade routes and ports, weakening its economic leverage over Addis Ababa.
Moreover, the alliance risks further entrenching divisions in the region. Egypt’s aggressive posture could drive Ethiopia to deepen its alliances with other influential actors, such as Kenya and Sudan, and bolster its diplomatic outreach to key global powers like China and the United States. This polarization could escalate existing tensions in the Horn of Africa, complicating efforts to resolve disputes peacefully.
The Broader Regional Context
Egypt’s attempt to expand its influence in the Horn of Africa also highlights the complexities of regional politics. Ethiopia remains a dominant economic and military power in the region, and its dam project is seen by Addis Ababa as essential to its national development. As such, Egypt’s strategy to rally opposition to Ethiopia through the Asmara alliance may face continued resistance from countries with significant economic stakes in maintaining strong relations with Ethiopia.
Djibouti’s decision to stay out of the alliance demonstrates the nuanced balancing act that smaller nations in the region must perform. While Eritrea and Somalia may see an opportunity to gain from closer ties with Egypt, Djibouti’s prioritization of economic pragmatism reflects a broader trend of nations pursuing self-interest over rigid alliances.
